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Title IX as a Tool for Eliminating Gender-Based Employment
Discrimination at Educational Institutions. North flaien Board of
Education r. Bell
I. INTRODUCTION
In North Ha ren Board of Education . Bell.' the Supreme Court ruled
that the Department of Education (ED). 2 under Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972,3 has authority to prohibit gender-based em-
ployment discrimination by educational institutions receiving financial
assistance from the Federal Government. Title IX prohibits gender-
based discrimination within educational programs or activities that re-
ceive federal financial assistance.4 Regulations promulgated by ED 5
pursuant to Title IX prohibit gender-based discrimination in employ-
ment practices of educational institutions receiving federal financial
assistance.'
North Ha'en challenged ED's authority to regulate employment
practices.7 The plaintiffs, two Connecticut public school boards. North
Haven Board of Education (North Haven) and Trumbull Board of Ed-
ucation (Trumbull) both received federal fundingX and so were subject
to the mandates of Title IX. Both school systems faced administrative
proceedings and potential loss of federal funds because of violations of
I 456US 51219X2).
2 In 1979. the Department of Education (ED) assumed functions of the [)epartment of
Ifealth. Education. and Welfare (IIEW) relating to Title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 34411a)(3) (Stpp V
1981) Both agencies are referred to as ED herein, though some actions relevant to this case
occurred prior to agency reorganization.
3 Pub L No 92-311. 86 Stat. 373 ictvified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976))
4 "'No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex. be excluded from participation
in. be denied the benefits of. or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
actii)q re'eiing Federal financial assistance . . .'" 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
E l-ach federal depanment or agenc,, which has authority to grant financial asimstance to
-in%, education program or activity is authorized to issue rules and regulations to eifectuate Title
IX %kith respect to such program or activity. 20 U.S C. § 1682 (1976) Employment regulations
implementing Title IX have been issued by ED. 34 C.F R. §§ 106.5 1-.61 (1982). the Department of
Agriculture. 7 CF R. §§ 15a.51- 61 (1983). and the Small Business Administration. 13 C.F R
113 1- 10 (19X3)
6 "'No person shall, on the basis of scx. be excluded from participation in. be dented the
benefits of. or be subjected to discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consideratlon, or
selection therefor. whether full-time or part-time, under any education program or activity oper-
ated by a recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance." 34 C F.R
§ Il51 . (1q82)
7 Id
8 North lHaven Bd of lEduc , lufstedler. 629 1 2d 773. 774-75 (2d Cir 1980)
1
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ED's employment regulations.9 The boards argued that Title IX's pro-
tections extended-only to students and that ED's authority under Title
IX was thus limited to those aspects of educational programs which
directly affected students.'0
A tenured teacher in the North Haven school system. Elaine Dove.
filed an administrative complaint with ED in January. 1978. She al-
leged the school board had violated Title IX by refusing to rehire her
after a one-year maternity leave." ED requested information from the
school board concerning its policies on hiring, leaves of absence, sen-
iority. and tenure." North Haven, however, refused to supply the in-
formation requested.'" ED then notified North Haven of possible
administrative enforcement proceedings.'" North Haven responded by
bringing suit against ED in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut. North Haven rquested a declaratory judg-
ment that ED did not have power to regulate employment under Title
IX. They also requested an injunction prohibiting ED from attempting
to terminate the district's federal funding for alleged violations of ED's
employment regulations.' The district coun ruled that Title IX did
not extend to employment practices and permanently enjoined ED
from terminating North Haven's federal funding for violations of ED's
employment regulations."
A former guidance counselor in the Trumbull school system. Linda
Potz. filed an administrative complaint with ED in October. 1977. She
alleged the school board was guilty of gender-based discrimination
with respect to job assignments. working conditions, and renewal of
employment contracts." ED investigated the complaint and advised
the board that it had violated Title IX's employment regulations."x ED
specified four violations. The board had required Potz to perform cler-
ical tasks not required of the male counselors." Her office had been
moved to a smaller, poorly heated, and less comfortable space away
from the other counselors.2" Supervisors had asked Potz to change a
report which showed she had seen many more students in a given week
9. Id at 774-75
10 Id at 775
II Id
12 Id
13 Id
14 Id
15 Id.
16 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Calhfano. 19 Fair Empl Prac Cas tBNA) 1505. 20 Empi
Prac )ec (CC1[' 30.19$ 4D. Conn. 2979)
17. North llavcn Bd. of Educ. v. Ilufstcdlcr. 629 F 2d 773. 775 (2d (*'t 1980)
IX Id
19 Id
20 Id
2
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than had her male counterparts.2' Finally. Trumbull had refused to
renew Potz's contract on the basis of her sex.22 ED advised the board
that corrective action was needed specifically advising that Potz be re-
instated, that she be given back pay, and that all adverse documents be
removed from her personnel file.' 3 ED further advised Trumbull that
formal administrative proceedings might be initiated if Trumbull failed
to comply voluntarily.2 '
Trumbull did not implement the requested corrective actions, but
rather filed suit against ED in the United States District Court of the
District of Connecticut.2" Trumbull. like North Haven. alleged that
regulation of employment was beyond the scope of ED's power under
Title IX. Trumbull also requested declaratory and injunctive relief.2 '
The district court, on the basis of its decision in the North Haven case,
granted Trumbull's motion for summary judgment. 2 The North Ha-
ven and Trumbull cases were consolidated on appeal before the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.23
The Second Circuit reversed the decisions of the district court, ruling
that ED had authority under Title IX to regulate employment and that
ED's employment regulations were valid as promulgated.2 ' The deci-
sion of the Second Circuit in North ttaven was clearly inconsistent with
decisions of four other courts of appeals.3 " and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 3 '
North Haven raised several issues of statutory construction. The
21 Id
22 Id
23 Id Y$eealu 2 L; S.C. § 1682 1976) (authoritv to seek soluntary compliance). Seeinfra
note 37
24 Brief lor the Federal Respondents. Appendix at 34. North Haven Bd. of Fduc. ,,. Bell.
454 US 512 t14821.
2.' North Ila,en Bd of Educ % lufstedler. 629 : 2d 773. 775 (2d O'r. 198u)
26 Id
27 rrumbull Bd of Educ v hEW. No 78-401 (D Conn Sept. 13. I179).
2. North flaven Bd of tduc. v Hlulstedler. 629 F 2d 773. 774 (2d Cir. 1980).
29 Id at 7X6
30i Yee Seattle Univ v. IIEW. 621 F.2d 992 (9th Car. 19801 (gender dicrimination in salarie.
paid to laculty members in School of Nursing). rocaed. United States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle
Univ. 456 U S 986 (1982): Romeo Community Schools v. HEW. 600 F.2d 581 i6th Cir.) (schotl
refused to alter maternitv leave policy to conform to ED's regulations). ert. denied. 444 U-S. 972
(1979). Junior College Dtst. v. Calhfano. 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.) (discrimination in salaries). cert
denied. 444 U.S. 972 11979); Islesboro School Committee v. Califano. 593 F.2d 424 (Ist Cr )
(pregnancy not treated in same manner as other temporary disabilities by school's leave of ab-
sence policy). cert. denied. 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
31. The Court had granted certiorari in another case involving the same issue prior to grant-
ig certiorari in Vvrth Haven. Seattle Univ. v. HEW. 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.i. cert. granted.sub
nom. United States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ.. 449 U.S. 1009 (1980). The respondent in that
case. Seattle University. considered the question moot and did not intend to prosecute the appeal.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512 (1982) A
petition for a writ of certorari had also been filed in Dougherty County School System v. Harris.
622 F 2d 735 5th Cir. 1980). Shortly after its decision in North Iaven. the Court granted certio-
3
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Supreme Court first faced the question of whether employment regula-
tion was included within the statutory language of Title IX. Since the
language of Title IX did not expressly include or exclude employment
regulation."2 the Court looked to congressional intent to include em-
ployment regulation within the scope of Title IX.
To ascertain congressional intent to regulate employment, the Court
reviewed the legislative history of Title IX. Examination of Title IX's
legislative history involved consideration of three different factors.
First, did statements made during floor debate indicate intent to in-
clude employment regulation within the scope of Title IX. Second, did
the action of the House-Senate conference committee indicate such in-
tent. Third, did congressional inaction following the adoption of Title
IX indicate congressional approval of ED's employment regulations.
The Court then considered three other issues of statutory construction.
First, was Title IX to be interpreted identically to Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 19643' in all respects. Second. did Congress intend to
establish a remedy for gender-based employment discrimination in ad-
dition to those remedies already existing.3" Third, was regulation of
employment consistent with Congress' overall purposes in enacting Ti-
tle IX.
After determining that regulation of employment was within ED's
authority under Title IX, the Court dealt with the validity of ED's em-
ployment regulations as promulgated. 31 This raised the issue of
whether the regulations were consistent with the statutory language of
Title IX.' The Court also discussed, but did not define, the scope of
ear in )oughert; Counta and '.acatcd the judgments in both Seatth, Unirc'rrtir and /t~ih'rii
( ounit 456 U S 986 (1982).
32 See 20 U.S.C § 1681(a) (1976) See jupra note 4
1.3 North Ilacn Bd of Lduc ' Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 522 (1982)
34 42 U S C § 2(.XX)d (1976) See inlfra note 45
35 The Equal Pa, Act. 29 id. § 206(d)(I) (1976). provides a remed, for discrimination in
salaries See infra note 197 Title VII of the Civil Right% Act of 1964 may proide a remed for
discrimination at an- stage of the employment relationship. 42 id. §§ 2(XX)c to 2Xk-17 9(76)
See injra note 196
36 North Haven Bd. of Educ v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 535 (1982)
37 Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be feciedd
11) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or
activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after an
opporuniny for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement. but such termination
or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity. or part thereof, or other recipient
as to whom such a finding has been made. and shall be limated in its eff.ct io the paricular
program. or part thereof in k-htch ruch noncompiance has been so found [emphasis addedi. or
1c by any other means authorized by law: Prov'ided. howes'er [emphasis in original]. That no
such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appro-
priate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined
that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminat-
ing. or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a require-
ment imposed pursuant to this section. the head of the Federal department or agency shall file
with the committees of the louse and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program
4
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application of Title IX.3"
This comment examines the history of Title IX, the Court's decision
in North Haven. and the possible ramifications of that decision. This
comment demonstrates that the Court correctly decided that ED has
authority to regulate employment and that ED's regulation will be
most effective if the scope of application is defined broadly.
1I. LEGISLATIVE AND POSTENACTMENT HISTORY OF TITLE IX
An overview of the legislative history of Title IX is essential to un-
derstanding the reasoning of the Supreme Court in North Haven.-0 Ti-
tle IX is one provision of a comprehensive program of federal support
for elementary. secondary, and higher education.4 The House version
of Title IX was part of the original comprehensive legislation. but the
Senate version of Title IX originated as a floor amendment.4 ' The
House and Senate versions of Title IX were almost identical with the
exception of a provision of the House bill expressly exempting employ-
ment regulation.4 2 This provision was deleted by the House-Senate
Conference Committee. "3
Title IX declares that: "No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex. be excluded from participation in. be denied the benefits
of. or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... ." The language
of Title IX is patterned after that of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of'
1964.'5 Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color.
religion, and national origin in programs receiving federal financial
assistance and authorizes effectuation of compliance with its provisions
or acilitv involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action
No such action shall become effectivc until thiry days have elapsed after the filing of such
report
20 USC § 16X2 (1976)
38 Norh Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 540 (1992).
39 Vee general/r Comment. iZEWr Regulation Under Tle /.I of the Educaton .4ne'ndnientr
it 1U72 Ultra Vire$ Challenges. 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 133.
40. See generally Wolanin & Gladieux. .4 Charterfor Federal Pokcr Toward Psrtrecundar
Educ'ation: The Eduraton .4mendmentr of 72.4 J.L. & Etouc. 301 (1975): Buck & Orleans. Set
Mrertminatian.-.4 Barto a Democratic Eaueaiion. Overrew of Title ." o/ the Education 4mend
mnts of0 7 .'. 6 Cos.'-. L. Ri.v. 1 (1973).
41. Compare II R. 7248. 92d Cong.. Ist Sess.. 117 CoNc;. Rt.c. 39.354 (1971) 'ith S. 659. 92d
Cong.. 1s1Se7.. ll7CoN ;. REc 30500 (1971). Seealso 118 Co,%(;. Rt..('. 5803 (1972) (language of
floor amendment).
42. See supra note 4 1.
43 S. Rep. No. 798. 92d Cong.. 2d Sess. 221, reprinted i 1972 U S. Co Co'as. & Al).
Ni ws 2609. 2671-72.
44 20 U S.C. § 1681(a) 11976).
45 "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race. color, or national origin, be
excludcd from participation in. be denied the benefits of. or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or aclivity receiving Federal financial assistance.*" 42 id. § 2000d 11976)..
5
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through funding termination." Title IX substituted 'on the basis of
sex" for Title VI's bases of race, color, religion, and national origin."
Title IX and Title VI differ in one important respect: Title VI expressly
excludes employment from its coverage, but Title IX includes no spe-
cific provision dealing with employment.4"
In addition to its general prohibition against gender-based discrimi-
nation. Title IX amended the Equal Pay Act of 1963.4" This amend-
ment extended coverage of the Equal Pay Act to previously excepted
professional employees.5 Title IX, as originally proposed in both the
House and Senate, would also have amended Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19645' by eliminating an exception for educational insti-
tutions. This amendment was enacted as part of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972 rather than as part of Title IX.--
Remarks made during Senate floor debate provide indications of leg-
islative intent. Senator Birch Bayh. Title IX's sponsor. addressed the
scope of Title IX's coverage. In a prepared statement summarizing the
floor amendment. Senator Bayh stated:
Central to my amendment are sections ... which would prohibit dis-
crinmination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs
... . This portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all ar-
eas where abuse has been mentioned-employment practices for
faculty and administrators, scholarship aid. admissions. access to pro-
grams within the institution such as vocational education classes, and
,o forth. "1
In response to an inquiry about the scope of Title IX. Senator Bayh
stated:
IWIe are dealing with three basically dilferent types of discrimination
here. We are dealing with discrimination in admission to an institu-
tion. discrimination of available services or studies within an institution
.... and discrimination in employment within an institution, as a
member of a faculty or whatever. In the area of employment, we per-
mit no exceptions.i
4
Action of the House-Senate Conference Committee provides further
indication of legislative intent. The original House version of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972 expressly excluded employment from pro-
46 Id §§ 2()X)d to 2X)d-4 11976).
47 20id § 161 (Ia) 1976) Scesupra note 4
48 Carnpare id. wih 42 id, §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976).
49 Compare 29id §213(1)1970wth id §213(l)(1976)
50 LEmplo.cc% in 'wna fide ecxecutive. administrative. and profcional capacatae. were not
coercd bN the Equal PaN Act before the 1972 amendment. Id. § 2131) 1170)
51 Compare 117 Co.,. Rt( 39.365 (1971) (orginai lowe ,ersion ofTitle IX) 4ih 118 id.
5X03 11972) (origial ,t.ermon of Senate floor arnendment).
52. Pub. L No. 92-261. 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S ('. § 2X)e- I (197t.))
53 1I1X Co.,(, Rt t 5 807 (1972)
54 Id at 5812
6
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visions prohibiting gender-based discrimination."55 Floor debate in the
House included no discussion of this limitation." The Senate version
did not exclude authority to regulate employment, and the House ver-
sion's limitation was eliminated by the conference committee." The
conference committee report explained this action only briefly: '*[Tjhe
House amendment, but not the Senate amendment, provided that noth-
ing in the title authorizes action. . . with respect to any employment
practice. . . except where a primary objective of the Federal financial
assistance is to provide employment. The House recedes."'
Title IX's postenactment history also provides some indication of
congressional intent to include employment regulation within the scope
of ED's authority under Title IX. ED submitted its regulations to Con-
gress for review.' Congress could have disapproved the regulations.
but did not do so.' In the ten years following Title IX's enactment.
Congress has considered two amendments that would have limited Ti-
tle IX's coverage of employment discrimination. " Neither amendment
passed.
1ll. DECISIONS BY THE COURTS OF APPEALS
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in North Ha'en. six of the fed-
eral courts of appeals had addressed ED's authority under Title IX to
regulate employment practices. The Courts of Appeals of the First.
Sixth. Eighth. and Ninth Circuits determined that employment regula-
tion was-not included within the scope of Title IX. 2 The Second Cir-
cuit ruled that ED had authority to regulate employment and that its
regulations were valid as promulgated. 3 The Fifth Circuit found that
55 II R 7248. 92d Cong. 6st Sess. 117 Co. o;. Ri( 38.354 11971).
56 See i17 Co.%;. Rtt. 39.248-63 119 7"1).
57 S Rep No 79X. 92d Cong. 2d Sess 221. reprinted in 1972 U S Cit o ('o%. .& At
Ni w% 260M. 2671-72
5M Id
59 40 Fed Reg. 24.12S 11975). Congress then had 45 days in which to adopt a resolution of
dmsapproval: since no such re-lution was adopted. the regulations became effective 20 U S (
§ 1232(d61) (1976).
60 Though two resolutions of disapproval were introduced in the liouse, the llouse passed
neither HIR. Con. Res. 329. 94th Cong.. Ist Sess- (1975). HR. Con. Res 330. 94th Cong.. 6st
Sess (1975). See 121 Co~s, Ri . 21.687 (1975) An amendment to Ii.R. ('on. Res 330 would
have expressly disapproved ED's employment regulations. Unpublished Amendment to ILR
Con. Res 330. quoted in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. hluf5tedler. 629 F.2d 773. 7X3 (2d Cit. 1980).
Since Congress did not pass a resolution of disapproval, the Title IX regulations became elfectis.
July 21. 1975
61. S. 2146 § 211). 94th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1975). would have expressly excluded employment
from Title IX's coverage. The Senate took no action on this bill, S. 1361. 97th Cong. 1st Sess..
127 Co.%, Ri. 6125 (198 1). would have excluded employment from the scope or Title IX and
would have expressly prohibited an institutional approach to the dcfinition of program for pur-
pises of Title IX. The Senate took no action on this bill.
62 See 5upra note 30 and cases cited therein.
63 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v flufstedler. 629 F-2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
7
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Congress intended Title IX to include some employment practices. but
found ED's regulations invalid insofar as they were not limited to prac-
tices directly affecting those employees who derived compensation di-
rectly, in whole, or in part, from federal financial assistance.'
The First Circuit, in Islesboro School Committee .Califano.,5 was
the first court of appeals to address ED's authority to regulate employ-
ment. The court began with an analysis of the language of Title IX and
determined that Title IX extended only to direct beneficiaries of stu-
dent funds. ie., students and those teachers working directly under fed-
eral grants.' The court found further support for this interpretation
because all of Title IX's specific exemptions deal with student activi-
ties." Since Title IX does not expressly include or exclude employ-
ment regulation." the First Circuit examined legislative history for
indications of congressional intent."9  The court regarded Senator
Bayh's remarks during floor debate as imprecise and inconclusive on
congressional intent."' The court reasoned that the House provision
expressly exempting employment regulation was eliminated to avoid
conflict with Title IX provisions relating to the Equal Pay Act 7' and
refused to construe congressional inaction as approval of ED's regula-
tions. - The First Circuit also refused to accept ED's argument that
discrimination against employees infected the school environment and
was harmful to students as well as employees.
Three courts of appeals followed the reasoning of the Islesboro court.
4 Dougherty County School System v. Harris. 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980) (salary supple-
ment paid to industrial arts teachers. but not to home economics teachers). racaied. Bell v. Dough-
crt% County School System. 456 U.S. 986 (1982).65 593 F 2d 424 11st Cr ) (pregnancy not treated in same manner as other tcmlprar). di.a-
bilitic, h ,chtl's leave of absence polca). cert. denied. 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
tte Id at 426
17 Speotc eucptions arc made for schools that begin admitting students of both seses tor
the first tine. rehgious .chools. miltar chools. institutions that have traditionally admitted stu-
dent, of onh one %ex. social fraternities and sororities. Boys/Girls State/Nation cont'crencc.. Ia-
ther-on .Ind mother-daughter activities, and scholarships awarded in "beauty" pageants 20)
U S C § I6X1la)( 1-19) (1976). Under a doctrine of eusdem gene ns. general provisions arc inter-
preted through more specilic pro% sion. Seegenera/i" Comment. .upra note 39 Eju.sdemgen'ris
i% gencrall. applied only when the general terms follow the specific terms. United States v. Pow.
ell. 423 U S 87 (1975) The general terms of Title IX precede, rather than follow, the specific
exemptions 20 U S.(. § 1681(a) (1976).
68. See 21 U S C. § 1681(a) (1976). See supra note 4.
69 Islcsbotro Schol Commitce v. Califano. 593 F.2d 424 (Ist Cir.) (prcgnancy not treated in
same manner a.% other temporary disabilities by school's leave of absence policy). ceri denied. 444
US 972 (1979).
71). The court reasoned that references to employment addressed those portions of Title IX
khich amended the Equal Pay Act and Title VIi. Id at 428.
71 Id
72 Id n 3 Yee also supra text accompanying notes 59-60
73 Ilsboro School Committce v Calhfano. 593 F.2d 424 list Car.) (pregnancy not treated in
ramc manner .,s other temporary disabilities by school's leave of absence policy). ceri. denied. 444
US 972 (1979).
8
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The Sixth Circuit, in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW 74 essentially
adopted the reasoning of the First Circuit. Moreover, the Romeo court
reasoned that the ultimate sanction for Title IX violations, funding ter-
mination, would be an unreasonable burden on students when imposed
because of institutional discrimination against an employee. 7- The
Eighth Circuit, in Junior College District of St. Louis v. Caliano. 7  ex-
pressly adopted the reasoning of the Islesboro court. The Ninth Cir-
cuit. in Seattle University v. HEW. 7 7 also adopted the Iselesboro
reasoning, in finding ED had no power to regulate employment.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, when faced with the
North Haven controversy, refused to follow the reasoning of the courts
of apeals that had previously decided the issue consistent with Isles-
boro. I The Second Circuit examined the legislative history of Title IX
thoroughly. That court found support for the inclusion of employment
within Title IX's coverage based on: remarks made during floor de-
bate: deletion of the House provision exempting employment: and.
based on Congress' failure to timely disapprove ED's employment reg-
ulations." The Second Circuit reasoned that this interpretation was
consistent with the overall objectives of Congress in enacting Title IX"
The Fifth Circuit, in its brief opinion in Dougherr Countr School
System t Harris," adopted an intermediate position. It found that Ti-
te IX was intended to cover some employment practices, but ruled that
ED's authority to regulate employment was limited to practices directly
affecting those employees whose compensation was supported directly.
in whole, or in part, by federal financial assistance. 2 The Fifth Circuit
held ED's employment regulations were invalid insofar as they were
broadly worded to apply to all employees of an educational system re-
ceiving federal financial assistance for any purpose.N
74. 600 F 2d 581 (6th Ci 11school refused to alter matcrnity leave policy to conflorm to L)'.
regulations). cert. denied. 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
75 Id at 584.
76. 597 F 2d 119 18th Cir.) Idiscrimination in salaries). cert. denied. 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
77. 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (gender discrimination in salaries paid to faculty member, in
Schml of Nursing. vacated. United States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ.. 456 U.S. 986 (1982).
78. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler. 629 F.2d 773. 777 (2d Cir 1980).
79 Id at 778
80. Id
8 1 622 F 2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980) (salary supplement paid to industrial arts teachers, but not to
home economics teachers). vacated. Bell v. Dougherty County School System. 456 U.S. 986
(1982).
82 This would include only employees an activities directly funded by federal monies. Id at
738.
83 Id
9
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IV. SUPREME COURT'S DECIsIoN IN NORTtH H.41'E.V
The Supreme Court84 began its analysis in Norrh Haren by examin-
ing the statutory language of Title IX. It determined that the broadly
worded directive, that "no person" be discriminated against on the ba-
sis of sex, favored inclusion of employees within the scope of Title IX
protection." Since Title IX does not, however, expressly include or
exclude employees from its scope, the Court looked at the legislative
history of Title IX to determine whether Congress intended to limit the
expansive statutory language in any way."'
The Court focused on three factors which support congressional in-
tent to include employment within the scope of ED's authority under
Title IX. First, remarks made during Senate floor debate on Title IX
indicated an intent to include prohibition of employment discrimina-
tion within its scope." Second, the House-Senate Conference Commit-
tee removed a provision of the original House version expressly
exempting employment from coverage of Title IXY" Third, postenact-
ment history indicated that Congress. though aware of the controversy
surrounding Title IX's employment regulations. failed to pass legisla-
tion eliminating employment from the coverage of Title IX.'" The
Court considered these factors corroborative of each other and of con-
gressional intent to include employment regulation within the scope of
Title IX.
The Court considered remarks made by Senator Bayh the only au-
thoritative indicia of congressional intent regarding the scope of Title
IX.' Though recognizing that remarks of a single legislator made dur-
ing debate may not be controlling, the Court found reliance on such
remarks justified in light of the scarcity of other evidence of legislative
intent.12
The North Haven Court regarded deletion of the House provision
exempting employment regulation as a conscious choice suggesting
Congress intended to prohibit employment discrimination under Title
IX. 3 The school boards argued that Congress deleted this provision to
avoid an inconsistency with Title IX provyisions relating to the Equal
84. The majority (6-3) opinion was written b,- Justice Blackmun North I lacn lid. of Educ.
v. Bell. 456 U.S 512 (1982).
85. Id at 520
86. Id. at 521.
87. Id. at 522.
88. Id at 524. See .upra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
89 Id at 527 See mupra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
90 Id at 530-31. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text
91. Id at 526.
92 Id at 527.
93. Id at 528.
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Pay Act." ' The majority refused to accept this argument. but instead
noted that Congress could have easily altered the language of Title IX
to eliminate any inconsistency. "
The Court viewed Title IX's postenactment history as additional
confirmation of congressional intent to prohibit gender-based employ-
ment discrimination in federally funded education programs."0 The
Court did, however, recognize that Congress' failure to disapprove
ED's employment regulations did not conclusively demonstrate that
Congress considered those regulations valid and consistent with legisla-
tive intent."" Although recognizing that postenactment developments
could not be accorded the weight of contemporary legislative history,
the majority observed:
IW]e would be remiss if we ignored these authoritative expressions con-
cerning the scope and purpose of Title IX . . . fWherej an agency's
statutory construction has been 'fully brought to the attention of the
public and the Congress.' and the latter has not sought to alter that
interpretation although it has amended the statute in other respects.
then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned."
The Court then addressed the similarity of Title IX and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' The North Haven and Trumbull school
boards argued that Title IX should be interpreted identically to Title
VI."tm' A provision of Title VI expressly exempts its application to em-
ployment discrimination.t "  Although recognizing interpretations of
Title VI as useful guides in construing Title IX, the North Haven ma-
jority refused to interpret Title IX as analogous to Title VI in all re-
spects."' 2 The Court reasoned that Title VI should be used to interpret
Title IX only when a different interpretation was not suggested by the
language and history of Title IX itself."'" The Court refused to inter-
pret Title IX as analogous to Title VI insofar as regulation of employ-
ment was concerned because the language of Title IX was not identical
to that of Title VI where employment regulation was involved"' and
because there was evidence suggesting Congress did not intend Title IX
94 (.mpue 29 U.S C. § 213(a)(1) 11970) wiuh id. § 213(a)(1) (1976).
95 North Ilaven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 529 11982).
96 Id at 530
97. Id. at 533. See also 20 U.S.C. § 12321d)1) (1976). which provides that failure of Con-
gress to disapprove regulations issued by ED shall not be conclusively presumed evidence of con-
gre.sional approval of the regulations.
9X North Ilaven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U S. 512. 535 (1982) (quoting Cannon v. Unier-
%it% of Chicago. 441 U.S. 677. 687 n.7 (1979) and United States v. Rutherford. 442 U.S. 544. 554
n.I0 11979)1 (emphasis added).
99 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 200Od-4 (1976).
1 1 North laven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 529 (1982).
1w 42 U.S C. § 20OOd-3 (1976).
102 North 11aven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 530 (1982).
13 /d at 529
14)4 Conpare 20 U S C. ,§ 1681-1686 119761 w th 42 id. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976)
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to have the same restrictions as Title V1.1'
The Court's decision in North Haen established an alternative rem-
edy for victims of gender-based employment discrimination by feder-
ally funded educational institutions. An aggrieved employee would
now have grounds for action under Title IX, the Equal Pay Act."' or
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.107 The dissent argued that an
intent for such duplication of remedies was not supported by Title IX's
legislative history."' but the majority considered duplication of reme-
dies a policy decision made by Congress.' ° Congress, the majority
reasoned. had also chosen to provide overlapping remedies in other ar-
eas of discrimination." The Court thus concluded that duplication of
remedies should not be deemed indicative of congressional intent to
exempt employment regulation under Title IX."I
The North Haven majority did not grant the traditional deference to
administrative interpretation of a statute because of conflict between
the administrative agencies responsible for enforcement of Title IX."2
The Secretary of Education, in a letter to the Attorney General, pro-
posed that employment regulations apply "only when the complaint
shows a clear nexus between the alleged employment discrimination
and discrimination against the students, or when the complaint shows
that the complainant is a beneficiary of a program in which a primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employ-
ment."' 'I The Attorney General refused to adopt this suggestion and
continued to support the regulations as promulgated." 4
After determining that Title IX gave ED authority to regulate em-
ployment practices at educational institutions receiving federal
financial assistance, the Court examined ED's regulations as promul-
gated to determine their validity.' "' The Court discussed the program-
specific nature of Title IX, criticizing that portion of the Second Cir-
cuit's decision which implied that ED's authority to issue regulations
105 North Ila% cn Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U S. 512. 530 (1982).
106 29 US.C. § 206(d)(1) (19761. See infra note 197 and accompan',ng text
107 42 id § 2000-2(a) (1976). See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
108 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U S. 512. 544 (1982) (Powell. J.. di.,enting).
I( W Id at 535 n.26.
110. Id See. e.g.. International Union of Elec.. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Robbins & M)cr%.
Inc. 429 U.S. 229. 236-39 (1976) (remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act independent of
other pre-existing remedies).
II I. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 535 n.26 (1982).
112. Id at 522 n.12.
113 Letter from Terrel If. Bell to William French Smith (July 27. 1981). reprinted in Dail)
Lab Rep. No. 150. at A-5 (Aug. 5. 1981). quoted in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U S
512. 522 n 12 (1982). See also Jenkins. The Solicitor Generalr Winning i-asr. 69 A B.A. J. 734.
737 ( 1483).
114 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 37. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U S. 512
1 1982 t
115 North Ilfaven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 UJ.S. 512. 535 (1982).
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was broader than its power to terminate funding.it 6 The Court ana-
lyzed ED's authority to issue regulations by looking to language of the
implementing legislation:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity. . . is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 901 of
this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regula-
tions, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial
assistance in connection with which the action is taken. "7 (Emphasis
by the Court.)
The Court thus concluded that ED's authority to issue regulations was
program-specific.
Though ED's employment regulations refer in general terms to em-
ployment practices of an educational institution.' ' the majority found
a program-specific limitation in a provision which states the general
purpose of the regulations."' The purpose of the regulations was "to
effectuate Title IX . . . which is designed to eliminate . . . discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." -'2 0 (Emphasis by the Court.) The Court
thus concluded that ED's employment regulations were valid as
promulgated.
Though determining that ED has program-specific authority to regu-
late employment practices through use of funding termination, the
North Haven Court remanded the case' 2' without determining whether
funding termination would be an appropriate remedy. 22 Remand was
necessary because the district court disposed of both the North Haven
and Trumbull cases on motions for summary judgment without a fac-
tual determination of whether gender-based employment discrimina-
tion actually occurred within either school system.' 2' The Supreme
Court noted, however, that neither school board contested issues of fact
116. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler. 629 F.2d 773. 785 (2d Cir. 1980). The
Second Circuit reasoned that though ED's funding termination powers were program-specific. ED
was not required to specify prior to termination which particular programs receiving financial
assistance were covered by its regulations.
117. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 537 (1982).
118. 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (1982). See jupra note 6.
119. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell 456 U.S. 512. 537 (1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 106.1
(1982). The North flaven majority cited Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th
Cir. 1969). a case involving funding termination under Title Vl. Comments accompanying ED's
Title IX regulations cited Finch as consistent with Title Vl's program specific requirements. See
40 Fed. Reg. 24.128 (1975). Finch held that federal funds may be terminated under Title VI on a
finding that they are -infected by a discriminatory environment.- Finch. 414 F.2d at 1078-79.
120. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1982).
121. North Ilaven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 539 (1982).
122 Id at 540.
123. Id
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in the district court, but argued instead that ED was completely with-
out authority to regulate employment.1' 4
The majority discussed, but did not define. "program" for purposes
of Title IX.' -  Neither school board defended on grounds that the
complaining employee did not work in a federally funded program, so
the lower courts were not forced to address the definition of pro-
gram.' 26 The Court reasoned that a definition was inappropriate at this
stage of the case.
In dissent, Justice Powell urged that the Court adopt the position of
the First. Sixth. Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.'27 Powell argued that a
natural reading of Title IX would limit its coverage to students.'2 ' The
dissent also argued that the legislative history of Title IX was ambigu-
ous and should not be relied upon to read in operative language not
included by Congress.'29
Several policy considerations were implicit in the Court's decision in
North Haren. The majority relied on the overall legislative objective of
eliminating gender-based discrimination in federally funded educa-
tional programs. 3 ' The majority refused to accept two policy argu-
ments advanced by the school boards. North Haven and Trumbull
argued that a remedy for employment discrimination should not be
recognized under Title IX because other remedies were available to
victims of gender-based employment discrimination at educational in-
stitutions.y' The board3 also argued that Congress did not intend any
harm caused to students by funding termination to be predicated on
discrimination against an employee.'3 -2 The majority considered both
questions to be Congressional judgments and so refused to base their
decision on either argument.'33
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S APPROACH
The Supreme Court in North Haven relied on its earlier determina-
tion of the legislature's underlying purpose in enacting Title IX. In
Cannon r. Universii of Chicago, 34 the Court determined that Con-
124 Id
125 Id
126 Id
127. Id at 542 fPowell. J.. dissenting). See also supra text accompanying notes 65-77.
128. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 541 (1982) (Powell. I. dissentng).
129. Id. at 550.
130. Id. at 531.
131. Id at 535 n.26.
132. Id
133. Id
134 441 U.S 677 (1979). The plaintiff in Cannon was denied admission to medical school
under a school policy which denied admission to persons over age thirty. The plaintiff alleged
that this policy excluded a disproportionate number of females and sought money damages. The
14
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gress enacted Title IX to eliminate federal support of gender discrimi-
nation in the nation's schools and to provide individual citizens
effective protection against such discrimination. "- Legislative debate
revealed that Congress considered Title IX to serve both these pur-
poses. During House debate, Representative Mink observed: "Any
college or university which discriminates against women applicants
. . . is free to do so under [Title IXI but such institutions should not be
asking the taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimina-
tion."'3-  In the Senate. Senator Bayh argued: -[Title IXi is a strong
and comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to pro-
vide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and
training for later careers .. . ." " Congress' choice of ultimate sanc-
tion for Title IX violations, funding termination, also indicated that
Title IX was enacted to eliminate federal support of gender discrimina-
tion. This choice of remedy is perhaps the strongest indication of the
overall legislative purpose.
The North Haven decision is consistent with a long-standing princi-
ple of flexible construction of remedial statutes.' Remedial statutes
are those enacted to benefit a special class of persons.' 9 Here again.
the Court looked to its earlier interpretation of Title IX in Cannon."'
In Cannon. the Court determined that Title IX's language focused on
the benefited class where it mandated, "'No person . . . shall, on the
basis of sex . . . be subjected to discrimination. "'' Congress chose to
center the language of Title IX on the persons involved rather than on
the agencies or the federal funds involved.' 42 Such a choice supported
the Court's classification of Title IX as a remedial statute.
Prior decisions supported the Court's reliance on available legislative
history. Committee reports have been used most often as evidence of
legislative purpose and intent.' 143 but when such reports have been un-
(oun recognized a private right of action under Title IX. In reaching its decision, the (annrn
('oun cxamined the special class for whose benefit Title IX was enacted. implied legislative intent.
adiancemeni of statutory purpose. and the historically federal function in protection against dis-
crimination Id at 619. See also Condo-Caritis. Cril Rights-Sex DiAsemination--Tite IX ,the
Education .4mendments of 1i72-Implied Rjght of.4cton. 18 DuQ. L. REv. 983 (1980).
135. Cannon %. University of Chicago. 441 U.S. 677. 704 (1979) (recognized private right of
action under Title IX).
136 Id at 704 n.36 (quoting 117 Cong. Rcc. 39.252 (1971)).
137 Id (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5806-07 (1972)).
138 See. e.g.. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith. 305 US. 424. 431 (1939) (remedial legislation
for benefit and protection of workers liberally construed).
139. See, e.g.. Con v. Ash. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
140. Cannon v. University of Chicago. 441 U.S. 677. 690 (1979) (recognized private right of
action under Title IX).
141. Id
142 Id at 693
143. See Carro & Brann. The US. Supreme Court and the Use of Legilatne Hlistories. .4
Statirtical.4nalisis. 22 JURIMI-TRICS J. 294. 304 (1982).
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available the Court has often looked to other available sources.'" In
North Haven. the Court relied on three such sources of legislative his-
tory and noted precedents supporting reliance on each of these
sources. t' 45  The Court addressed opposing interpretations of each
source of legislative history. but found those interpretations unpersua-
sive in light of Title IX's overall purpose and remedial nature.
VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The ultimate ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in North
Haven may not be apparent for some time. Effective use of funding
termination as a remedy for violations of Title 1X's employment regu-
lations will depend on interpretations of its program-specific require-
ments. The issue of the definition of "'pogram" for purposes of Title
IX has yet to be addressed, since it was not specifically raised in the
North Haven case.'
At least two approaches to the definition of "program" are possible.
Under an "'institutional" approach. an entire school district would be
considered a program for purposes of Title IX. 4" The entire district
would be subject to all mandates of' Title IX if the district received
federal monies for any purpose. 4  All federal funding could be termi-
nated if any violation of Title IX's requirements were found. A "pin-
point" approach to the definition of program would limit the applica-
tion of Title IX's requirements to those individual activities funded in
whole or in part by federal monies.' 4 ' A factual nexus between the
person discriminated against on the basis of gender and the funded
activity would be necessary to invoke Title IX's funding termination
provision.
Title IX's language and legislative history provide little indication of
144. Id
145 North Iaven Bd of tduc v Bell. 456 U S 512. 527-35 (1992). S ot~ a Fcderal 1:ncri!%
Admin v Algonquin SNG. Inc. 426 U S 548. 564 I1976) (statements of legislation'., spX)nor
dc..rve substantial weight): Gulf Oil Corp v Copp Paing Co.. 419 U.S. 186. 199 (1974) Ideletion
of a provision by a conference committee militate% against a judgment that Congre.. intended .i
result that it expressly declined to enact). United States v. Rutherford. 442 U.S. 544. 554 (1979)
(congressional inaction construed as indication that intent properly discerned).
146. North llaven Bd. of Educ v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 540 (1982). Seera/. iupra text aiccomp.-
nying notes 121-24.
147. See Comment. supra note 39. at 169.
148. Federal financial assistance is directed toward specific activities within educational insti-
tutions. Eg. money to purchase xxks or equipment. 20 U.S.C. § 1801-1821 (1976); education
of the handicapped. id §§ 1401-1461 11976). and school lunch programs. 42 id. §§ 1751-17691a)
(1976)
149. See Crow. Does 7tile , ofthe 'duatton .4mendmenls of1072 Prohibit Frmnploi'rnnl /T.
rnrmnaio --An ,4nast.r. 22 B C.L Riv. 1099. 1129 (1981)
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congressional intent on the definition of program.'5: An institutional
approach would seem consistent with the general purpose of Title IX.
ie.. elimination of gender discrimination in educational institutions.
Because of its potential impact on an institution receiving federal fund-
ing for a variety of activities, it would likely serve to increase voluntary
compliance.
The similarity of enforcement provisions of Title IX and Title VI
implies adoption of an institutional approach to the definition of pro-
gram. The Supreme Court in Cannon determined that enforcement
provisions of Title IX were intended to be identical to those of Title
VI.' Under Title VI, educational institutions at the elementary and
secondary levels are generally treated on a district-by-district basis
while higher education systems may be treated on a statewide basis. '"2
Interpretations of Title VI imply that an entire school district should be
considered a "program" at the elementary and secondary levels for
purposes of Title IX. Similarly, an entire state might be considered a
.program" where higher education systems are involved.
Both a -benefit- theory and an "infection" theory support an institu-
tional approach to the definition of "program". A "benefit" theory
postulates that federal assistance received for a specific purpose benefits
the entire institution by releasing funds which would otherwise be used
for that specific purpose for use in other areas within the institution.'"
An -infection" theory looks to the effect of discrimination in one area
of an institution as it affects the total environment of the institution. 1:4
In the context of regulation of employment. discrimination against em-
ployees could be considered to have an adverse effect on the environ-
ment of the institution, resulting in adverse effects on the students as
well as on the employees.
Voluntary compliance is the primary means of eliminating gender
discrimination under Title IX."- If ED determines that a school has
violated Title IX. it can order the school to take corrective actions.'56 If
the school does not comply voluntarily. ED can initiate proceedings to
1511 'ee Note..4dmtnt.rature ( utfl'q Fiederal Fundn
, 
Under Tltle Ik .4 Proposed Interpre.
ianin !I-Program". 52 IN[) L 651. 656 (1977).
151 Cinnon v. University of Chicago. 441 U.S. 677. 694 (1979) (recognized private right of
action under Title IX).
152 See. e.g.. [Job Jones Univ. v Johnson. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974) (upheld Veterans
Administration order terminating right of eligible veterans to receive benefits while attending
m.hool following racially discriminatory admissions policy). q,/Jd mem.. 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir.
1975)
153 See generalli Comment. spra note 39. at 182.
154 See general/r J:ol%.. Ttle L" Coicrage of Gender Discrimaiwn in Amplmnn Practices
ty'.'ducaiional lnotwuinins. 15 StLI-I-OLK U.L Ri.v 261. 283 (1981).
155 20 USC § 1682 11976). See supra note 37
156 Id
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terminate funding.'1 7 A school faced with possible funding termina-
tion is more likely to implement corrective actions than a school faced
with requests for voluntary compliance. Since Title IX was enacted.
ED has not terminated funding to any recipient institution.' ' This
may be an indication of the strong incentive for voluntary compliance
that funding termination provides. This incentive would be strongest
under an institutional definition of program. Under an institutional
definition, a school could lose more funding. and so would be more
likely to comply voluntarily.
Use of funding termination as an ultimate sanction for Title IX vio-
lations is an indication of the importance Congress has given to elimi-
nation of gender discrimination in educational institutions.
Termination of funding is concededly a harsh remedy, though it is this
harshness that leads to its effectiveness. Opponents of an institutional
approach to the definition of program argue that since funding termi-
nation is detrimental to the intended beneficiaries of Title IX it should
be applied to only specific areas within an institution. "' The potential
harm resulting from continued federal funding of an activity in which
there is some form of gender discrimination, however, outweighs the
potential detrimental effects of funding termination. "
Initial interpretations of the Norih Haven decision by the lower
courts show conflicting definitions of program. The Third Circuit'"'
and the Fifth Circuit" adopted an institutional approach. but the
Sixth Circuit"' and one federal district court"' employed a pin-point
approach. Both Grove City College ". Bell"' and Hi/.rdale College t.
HEW "' involved ED's attempt to terminate grant and loan funds to
students at private colleges not in compliance with provisions of Title
IX. Neither college received federal financial aid. though loans and
grants were made to individual students at both schools."' 7 Since no
specific activity at either school received federal funding. termination
of funding was inappropriate in either case unless an institutional ap-
proach to the definition of program was adopted.
157 Id
158 See Pituojit r o.% Etju . Liji'( .lio% Ratuis. TinsI IX Bit .L % tI O'-I I \Ix
159 See Brief for Petioners North Haven Board of Lducation and Trumbull Board of Edit-
catton at 15. Nonh Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U S 512 j 1182)
160 See Comment. infra note 200. at 445.
161. Grove City College v. Bell. 687 F2d 684 j3d Cir. 1982). c,,rt. granied. 51 U S L W 3611
(U S.. Feb. 22. 1983) (No. 82-792).
162. Iron Arrow Ilonor Soc*N v. Itccklcr. 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1983)
163 lillsdale College v. IIEW. 696 F 2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982,.
164. University of Richmond v Bell. 543 F Supp 321 (.l) Va 19X2)
165. 687 F 2d at 688.
i66 696 F.2d 418. 420 (6th Cir 1982)
167. Id. at 420: 687 F.2d at 688.
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The Grove Ci)' College court interpreted North Haven as an implicit
adoption of an institutional approach to defining program.'"" The
court ruled funding termination was mandated if the college did not
comply voluntarily. The court discussed a "'benefit" theory, determin-
ing that federal loans and grants made to individual students benefited
the entire college."0 9 The court observed:
We cannot agree. however. that Congress intended to limit the purpose
and operation of Title IX by a narrow and illogical interpretation of its
program-specific provisions. Rather. we believe that Congress intended
that full scope be given to the non-discriminatory purpose that Title IX
was enacted to achieve, and that the program-specific terms of Title IX
must therefore be construed realistically and flexibly.'
71
The Hillsdale College court refused to follow the decision in Grove
Citiy College and refused to terminate funding to the college. Rather
than concentrating on Title IX's overall purposes, the Sixth Circuit
stressed the strict program-specific language of Title IX and adopted a
pin-point definition of program.' 7 ' In so doing, the Sixth Circuit fol-
lowed its earlier decisions limiting the application of Title IX.'
72
In Hoffer v. Temple Universitr.'7 another decision by the Third Cir-
cuit, the court determined that intercollegiate athletic programs 74 ben-
efited from receipt of federal funds by other parts of the University.
and so were subject to the mandates of Title IX. The Third Circuit
relied on its decision in Grove City though the athletic programs them-
selves received no direct federal financial assistance.' 5 Universinp of
Richmond v. Bell'7' also involved a challenge to ED's authority to reg-
ulate athletic programs that received no direct federal financial assist-
ance. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
interpreted North Haven as not requiring that Title IX be applied to the
athletic programs. 177
Iron Arron, Honor Society r. Heckler"" involved ED's action to ter-
minate funding to the University of Miami, a private school. The Iron
16 6S7 1: 2d at 691
169 Id. at 705
170 Id at 697
171 1lllsdale College v. HEW. 696 F.2d 418. 424 (6th Cr. 1982).
172. Romeo Community Schools v. HEW. 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.) (school refused to alter
maternity leave policy to conform to ED's regulations). cert. dented. 444 U.S. 972 (1979)
173 68M F.2d 14. 17 (3d Cir. 1982).
174 No scholastic athletic activity receives direct financial aid. so ED's authority to regulate
athletics is thus dependent on the definition of program adopted. See. e.g.. Note. Sex Dircrimina-
tin tn /igh School ,4thlettcs: An Examination of Applicable Legal Doctrines. 66 Mtis.. L. Ri.v
1115. 1128 (1982).
175 flotrer v. Temple Univ.. 688 F.2d 14. 15 (3d Cir. 1982).
176. 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
177 Id at 326.
178. 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Arrow Society was the most prestigious honorary recognition society at
the university. " Iron Arrow admitted only males. *" " The society itself
received no federal funds, but the university received substantial
financial assistance. " ' Though the university prohibited Iron Arrow
from using campus facilities for its initiation ceremony, the university
had not severed all connections between it and Iron Arrow.1"2 Iron
Arrow continued to hold a university charter and "sponsorship" from
the office of the president as well as continuing to use the university's
name.'
" .8
The Iron Arrow court interpreted North Haven to support termina-
tion of funding to the university because of its relationship with Iron
Arrow. The court observed:
ITIlhe existence of the all-male Iron Arrow Honor Society as the most
prestigious honorary-recognition society at the University has a perva-
sive discriminatory effect upon women in all of the University's aca-
demic programs. federally funded or not. All federal programs at the
University of Miami are necessarily infected b what amounts to a gen-
eral and overriding policy of the University. '
The court thus denied Iron Arrow's request for an injunction against
funding termination.
The definition of program for purposes of Title IX has been ad-
dressed by only a few federal courts since the North Haven decision.
The disparity among decisions shows the need for clarification of the
intended definition of program. The Court recently granted certiorari
to resolve this issue. " 5
ED has adopted an institutional approach in its enforcement ef-
forts. " ' Title IX will be most effective if ED continues to pursue this
approach. Vigorous enforcement policies are necessary to insure the
effectiveness of Title IX as a tool for eliminating gender-based employ-
ment discrimination. The current secretary of ED has not supported
ED's employment regulations " ' and may not pursue their enforcement
vigorously. President Ronald Reagan has suggested that ED be dis-
banded. If this proposal"' is adopted. enforcement policies might be
affected.
179, Id at 551
180. Id
181 Id n.2
182. Id at 551.
183. Id at 552.
184. Id. at 561.
185. Grove City College v. Bell. 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982). ceri. granted. 51 U.S L.W. 3611
(U S Feb. 22. 1983) (No. 82-792).
186 See. e.g.. ililsdale College v. HiEW. 696 F.2d 418 (61h Car 1982).
187 See.rupra text accompanying notes 112-14.
188. A bill introduced in the current Congress would disband the Department of Education
II.R 714. 98th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1983). But cf. Wall Street J.. June 9. 1983. at I. col. 3. (Reagan
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EMPLO YMENT DISCRIMINATION
ED's employment regulations would seem to apply to all employees
within an educational institution.a 9 Those cases decided thus far have
involved only professional staff persons. An institution faced with Title
IX sanctions because of discriminatory practices involving nonprofes-
sional staff. ie., clerical staff, teacher aides, janitorial staff, might argue
that ED's regulations should be applied only to professional staff per-
sons.'O The institutions might attempt to distinguish between profes-
sional and nonprofessional staff because students are less directly
affected by nonprofessional staff. This argument would fail under an
analysis that concentrated on effecting the overall purpose of Title IX,
ie., eliminating all federally supported gender discrimination at educa-
tional institutions.
A case decided shortly after North Ha'en, Mississippi Universinrifor
Women P. Hogan,' raises the issue of the validity of the specific ex-
emptions to the application of Title IX. In Hogan, the male plaintiff
was denied admission to a state-supported university that had tradi-
tionally limited its enrollment to women. The Supreme Court found
the school's admission policy invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause." 2 The school argued that Title IX's exemption for institutions
traditionally admitting only students of one sex t13 was evidence of con-
gressional intent to permit such institutions to continue to exist as they
had in the past. The Court determined that even if Congress had so
intended, such an application of the Title IX exemption would conflict
with the Constitution.'94 Hogan raises the question of whether the
Court would consider other exemptions to the application of Title IX
valid if challenged. For example, could an employee at a military
school, currently exempt under Title IX, 1 argue that this exemption is
not valid and that she/he is protected under ED's employment
regulations.
Victims of gender-based employment discrimination at federally
spkesperson Larry Speaks gave legislative realities" as the reason Reagan probably won*t
achieve goal of disbanding Department of Education).
1149 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (1982). See upra note 6.
190. The dissenting opinion in Norih Haven ratsed this argument. North Haven Bd. of Educ
Bell. 456 US. 512. 543 n.6 (1982).
191. 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
192. Id at 3340. The Court stated that a statute classifying on the basis of gender could be
upheld only by showing that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that
the means employed arc substantially related to those objectives. See. e.g.. Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co.. 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (statute denying benefits to widower in absence of proof of
dependence on wife's earnings but granting benefits to widow without proof of dependence on
husband's earnings invalid under Equal Protection Clause): Personnel Adm'r. v. Feeney. 442 U.S.
256. 273 (1979) (statute granting preference to veterans valid under Equal Protection Clause).
193 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1976).
194 Mssiissppi Univ. for Women v. flogan. 102 S. Ct. 3331. 3340 (1982).
195 20 U.S C. § 1681(a)(4) (1976).
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funded educational institutions may seek relief under Title IX. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act."' or the Equal Pay Act."9 7 The remedy
provided under Title IX, funding termination, is potentially more effec-
tive than remedies available under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces
both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.' 98 The EEOC has authority to
seek voluntary compliance if a violation has occurred, but it has no
authority to initiate funding termination.'" Title IX, because of its
funding termination provision, may provide more incentive for volun-
tary compliance than Title VII or the Equal Pay Act.2'° Voluntary
compliance is desirable for victims of discrimination because it may
provide quicker and less costly relief than judicial action.2tt
Title IX and Title VII apply to any type of discrimination in employ-
ment whereas the Equal Pay Act is limited to wage discrimination. To
recover under the Equal Pay Act, an employee must prove disparate
wages between substantially equal. although not identical, positions.2-"
An employee could not recover under the Equal Pay Act if there were
no equivalent positions within the institution.0 3
The North Haven decision could potentially affect a large number of
women. During the 1980-81 school year, 985.300 women were em-
ployed as teachers in public elementary schools nationwide. -" During
the same period. 487,900 women were employed as teachers in public
secondary schools205 and 104.663 women held full-time faculty posi-
tions in the nation's public and private colleges and universities.2"
16 *It shall be an unlawful employment practice ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his conmpensa-
tion. terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. because of such individual's race. color, reli-
gion. sex. or national origin . . .- 42 id. § 2000c-2(a)(I) (1976).
197. No employer . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of se bN
paying wages . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wage. t) cmployccs of the
opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill. el'ort.
and responsibility and which are performed under similar working conditions
29 id. § 2061d)(1) 11976).
198. 42 id. § 2000€-5(b) (1976) (Title VII): Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978. 3 C F.R 321 11979).
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1155 (1982) (Equal Pay Act).
199 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); 29 id. §§ 211. 216(b) (1976).
2(. See Comment. Zimmating Se.r Discrirnation in Educational In.rtution.r" )oes Th" IX
Reach Emplorrmeni?. 129 U. Pk. L. Ri.v. 417 J1910).
201. To recover under a Title VII claim, an aggrieved employee must comply with procedures
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Failure to file a complaint with the
EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination bars recovery. Orahood v. Board of Trustees.
645 F.2d 651. 658 (8th Cir. 1981).
202. Homer v. Mary Inst.. 613 F.2d 706. 713 (8th Cir. 1980).
203. Gunther v. County of Washington. 602 F.2d 882. 887-89 (9th Cir. 1979l. ajffd. 452 U.S
161 (1981).
204. See National Center for Education Statistics. DioiST or Et)uCAtoN S1,siisra ., (1982)y
205 Id
206. See National Center for Education Statistics. F"A(ULTY SALARY. TI-%umt.. Ast) BI.NI 1 I1.%
(1980-81).
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EMPL 0 YMENT DISCRIMINATION
Since almost all of the nation's schools received some type of federal
financial aid during the 1980-81 school year.20 7 each of these women
would have been prc'ected by ED's employment regulations under an
institutional definition of program. Many other women working in
nonprofessional positions in the nation's schools could also be
protected.
Elimination of gender-based employment discrimination in the
schools is important in eliminating sex-stereotyping and in encouraging
female students to seek academic achievements. Women comprise an
overwhelming majority, 83%. of public elementary school teachers.2t"
The percentage of women in public secondary faculties declines to
49%21' and the percentae in full-time college and university positions
declines further to 26%." These statistics illustrate that elementary
education is traditionally a female field, and also illustrate the lack of
female role models for women in higher education.
Though a Title IX claim may be based on a theory of disparate treat-
ment. a case recently decided by the Supreme Court2 l' suggests that a
theory of disparate impact may be employed in a Title IX case only
under limited circumstances. In Guardians Association r. Civil Service
Comm.nission ofNen York, 212 a badly-divided Court held that a private
plaintiff in a Title VI action was entitled to only declaratory and lim-
ited injunctive relief unless discriminatory intent was shown. Since Ti-
tle IX remedies are to be interpreted as analogous to those under Title
VI,2 '" the standards of Guardians Association will probably be applied
to private actions under Title IX.2
Recognition of a disparate impact theory under Title IX could facili-
tate recovery in those cases coming within the limitations of Guardians
.4ssociaiion. A private Title IX plaintiff who could not meet the bur-
den of proving discriminatory intent2 t would nonetheless be entitled
to prospective relief on a showing of disparate impact. A theory of
disparate impact is consistent with, and essential to achievement of. the
207 See National (enter for :ducation Statistc%. o)ItF T O! EIt'( %rzo% Sr.% risris (I982).
2Xt Id
209 Id
210 .Y-e National ('enter Itr Education SatistscS. FA( UL' SAL4.RH . Ti tRi. %m) Bi st -ItS
1 1980-811
211 Guirdians A%%'n % ('vil Ser, Comm'n. 51 U S.L.W. 5105 (July I. 1983)
212 Id at 5106
213 Cannon v. University of Chicago. 441 U.S. 677. 694 (1979) (recognized private right of
action under Title IX).
214 The Seventh Circuit denied recognition to a disparate impact claim in a private action
under Title IX. Cannon v University of Chicago. 648 F 2d 1104. 1106 (7th Cir. 1981) Idenied
plaitfifl claim that medical school admi.won policy excluded more women than men and so
'.iolaied Title IX). cerr denied. 51 U.S.L.W 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28. 1983) (No. 82-1179).
215 See Friedman. (ongre.i.r. TAh. Courts. and Ser-Based A$mploqrment Diserzmrnauton in
/I/zhe'r Educalun .4 Tale t ( To Tatles. 37 VA.Nt). L. Ri.v. 37 (1981).
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overall purpose of Title IX, ite., eliminating federal support of gender-
based discrimination. 2 " A disparate impact theory may be an impor-
tant tool in eliminating traditional sex-stereotyping in educational em-
ployment. 17 ED's employment regulations recognize disparate impact
in prohibiting an institution from recruiting primarily at entities which
furnish primarily members of one sex if the recruiting has the effect of
discriminating on the basis of sex.2"
Since a private right of action is recognized under Title IX. 210 an
effect of the North Haven decision may be an increase in private actions
to enforce ED's employment regulations. A Title IX plaintiff in a pri-
vate suit may be entitled to attorneys' fees.22 " Availability of attorneys'
fees may encourage private suits as a supplement to ED's enforcement
efforts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The .Vorth Haven determination that ED has authority to regulate
employment under Title IX is supported by several relevant factors.
These factors include the statutory language of Title IX, its legislative
history. its overall purpose, and other Supreme Court interpretations of
Title IX. Title IX's funding termination provisions make it a poten-
tially effective tool for eliminating gender-based employment discrimi-
nation at educational institutions. Title IX will be most effective in the
area of employment if an institutional approach to the definition of
program is adopted and if a vigorous enforcement policy is adopted.
Though questions remain as to the scope of effect of the North HIaen
decision. it is clear that the decision may be a tool for bringing the
nation's schools closer to the goal of eliminating all forms of gender-
based discrimination in education.
ALICE R. SENCHAI.*
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217 .VSee %upra text accompanying notes 204-10.
21, 34C.+'R.§ 10653(1982).
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220 42 U S.C. § 198X (1976).
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